A U.S. President is once again reevaluating American space policy. The direction the Obama Administration will take with respect to its current program, Constellation, is unclear. Many options lay before President Obama, and several groups have once again put forth a new set of proposals for the reorganization of NASA. This paper evaluates two policy proposals that call for the reorganization of American space policy. These are: Maximizing NASA's Potential in Flight and on the Ground: Recommendations for the Next Administration by Abbey, et al, and Sustainable Space Exploration and Space Development: A Unified Strategic Vision by Hsu and Cox. We adopt a three-test methodology for evaluating these space policy proposals using the model of reasoning, the model of society, and the model of policymaking. We suggest several necessary components that should be required for any national space program and explore whether they are sufficient to carry out government and commercial space efforts. These include: financial and technical capabilities, political and public support, legal requirements (both national and international), and the ability to conduct independent or cooperative missions. We also discuss the preliminary findings of the Augustine Panel and review NASA's current program --Constellation. Finally, we give our own thoughts in summary of these considerations. 
I. Introduction
HE National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 was the first public promulgation of American Space Policy. * Since 1958, American space policy has suffered from a host of ailments including lack of consistent political vision, severe funding fluctuations, varied definitions of American space policy and disaggregate policy-making. While the exuberance following the Moon landings between 1969 and 1972 filled Americans and the world with ideas and possibilities for humans in outer space, in reality American visions of exploration and dominance in outer space faded away due to political and funding realignments. As a result, popular notions of hotels in space, regular habitation of the Moon, and missions to Mars never materialized. Today, the confluence and increasing degree of private and public ventures in outer space have created many policy proposals calling for a range of missions, inter alia, establishing Moon bases, going to Mars, and Earth-focused missions. Yet, space is utilized to a greater extent than at any other time in human history: NASA and various other space agencies still send humans into space, but are confined to low Earth orbit; commercial space ventures march toward maturity; and State participation and space agencies proliferate, diminishing the market power NASA once held. However, private spaceflight ventures have yet to be fully birthed. Given how complicated and involved space policy has become, we argue that policy choices American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 6 space. With the inauguration of President Ronald Reagan in 1981, American space policy sought to be more inclusive of private enterprise. What ended up happening is that NASA policy and American space policy started to move away from each other.
Third, Presidential leadership has not guided NASA's policy goals and objectives to meet the visions laid out by successive presidents since President Kennedy. NASA and Presidential scholars have noted that presidential leadership of space policy has been something of a myth . 18 The complexity of issues related to space is affected by actors in tandem or in competition with presidential leadership. A president can shape policy but very rarely leads. This is due to several factors: presidents tend to only see the short-term political benefits rather than any long-term vision that would be required for a sufficient national space program; there is no incentive for a future president to implement the vision of their predecessor(s); Congress has a leading role in how money is dispensed, therefore has had a disproportionate influence on space policy; Congress tends to kill large nonmilitary projects from time to time if they are not politically identifiable with jobs, job creation, district wealth creation or are of unjustifiably high cost; and outside social and economic shocks tend to affect funding, leadership, and/or technology development. Presidents, more times than not, must build a consensus to make their vision of space a reality. To understand why some reforms were implemented, we must draw our attention away from both presidential politics and NASA's internal struggles, as NASA has been most profoundly affected by the wider social, economic, and political forces that create the changes in the policy environment within which NASA operates. This explains, in large part, why NASA's long-term strategic goals never get implemented.
Fourth, the ability of NASA administrators to influence budgets ended with James Webb (Kay 1995) . 19 Since the 1970s, NASA administrators have fought with presidential budget directors ). 20, 21 Only recently has Congress mandated strict cost controls in NASA budgets (Full Cost Accounting). Furthermore, no NASA administrator has had the same clout with Congress or a President as James Webb, nor has any administrator after Webb had a similar mandate . 22 Additionally, Congress, while having the authority to see policy through, has no unifying champion of space policy. In general, it is difficult for any particular member of the House or Senate to get his/her colleagues to follow along on most pieces of legislation with 535 members representing 435 districts and 50 states. Consequently, NASA must compete for its share of the pie with many other programs in the federal budget. Congress consistently changes NASA budgets from year to year, sometimes without changing the mandates of the programs being funded.
Fifth, the managerial culture within NASA and among the field centers have been repeatedly criticized for, inter alia, excessive risk-taking, lack of problem delegation, and improper program management (McCurdy 1994). 23 , ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ Lack of centralized authority from NASA headquarters has caused problems, but so has mission pressures on field centers that are at times in competition with each other for funding and personnel. Additionally, the distance between NASA centers has led to program failures, which in turn has caused programs to go over-budget, to be scrapped and/or produced failed missions.
§ § § § § These are serious administrative issues that NASA continues to try to mitigate.
Sixth, some space historians, policy analysts, and political scientists have noted that the creation of the Space Transportation System (aka Space Shuttle) was one of NASA's biggest space policy failures (Logsdon 1986 ). 24 The Space Shuttle has been called an aging or experimental reusable launch vehicle that is so augmented from its original design and mission that it financially drains NASA resources away from other projects. It is true that the Space Shuttle is expensive to operate and maintain. However, it has been pointed out that the Space Shuttle has serviced America's human spaceflight needs for almost thirty years, shown off American spaceflight prestige, and has served as a flexible platform for scientific activities (Launius 2006) . 25 Regardless, President Reagan's decision in 1986 to prohibit commercial payloads on the Space Shuttle helped provide incentive for private launch vehicle development . 26 This has limited the Space Shuttle's usability. Seventh, the lack of infrastructure development in outer space has limited NASA space policy options. Further infrastructure will be required for humans to conduct any activities in space. The International Space Station (ISS) is ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ See e.g. the conclusions related to NASA management in the Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, June 6, 1986 , NASA History Office Website, available at http://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/51lcover.htm (accessed August 17, 2009 ). See also the Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report, August 26, 2003 , NASA Website, available at http://caib.nasa.gov/ (accessed August 17, 2009 ). § § § § § Consider that the failure of the Mars Climate Orbiter was caused by improper conversion of units in the software that could have been corrected by diligent program management. The total cost of the orbiter and the lander was $327.6 million (not including the Deep Space 2 craft). See Mars Climate Orbiter Facts Sheet, Jet Propulsion Laboratory Website, available at http://mars.jpl.nasa.gov/msp98/orbiter/fact.html (accessed August 17, 2009 ). 7 the first step, but the controversy surrounding its design and mission has caused a great deal of pessimism among some space policy experts at the expense of long-term strategic vision (Neal 2007) . 27 We do not necessarily argue that the ISS design was the most optimal, but we do agree that the rationale for life support systems and research facilities in outer space are required elements toward outer space development for long-term human habitation. Knowledge gained from using the ISS will enable policy-makers to have a better understanding of long-term biological effects in outer space. The technology and expenditures needed to develop a Moon base or a mission to Mars has yet to materialize from the private or public sectors.
These limitations have framed NASA as a lost and, at times, dysfunctional agency. However, while some criticism has been warranted, in particular, with respect to NASA management, by and large NASA policy has provided America with a working national space agency providing missions that have helped accumulate a substantial amount of knowledge about outer space and the universe. In many respects, NASA policy has raised America's profile in space, rather than lowered it. NASA is still America's space agency.
D. Vision for Space Exploration: Constellation Program
On 
III. Methodology
The success of public policy is largely dependent upon whether a given policy is rational and reasonable in light of available resources and societal conditions. To capture these aspects, we have developed a methodology that consists of three tests in which to frame space policy proposals. Below we discuss how these three policy tests work.
Our data set consisted of two proposals authored by Abbey et al. and Hsu and Cox. We evaluated each one with respect to three tests and compared them against a baseline of optimal elements we defined as necessary for the development of outer space through sustained human and non-human spaceflight capabilities. These elements are:
• Financial and technical capabilities;
• Political and public support;
• Legal requirements (both national and international); and • The ability to conduct independent or cooperative missions.
We used this baseline to evaluate each proposal in the first and third tests, the model of reasoning and the model of policy-making, respectively. We distinguished between elements of human spaceflight capabilities and nonhuman spaceflight capabilities; however, there is generally overlap between both sets of capabilities. Human spaceflight capabilities are those elements that enable the secure and proper function of space missions for continual human habitation in outer space. These include: infrastructure, such as closed life support systems and enabling technologies; launch vehicles and support crew; navigation systems, such as satellites and tracking stations; and mission specific technologies, inter alia, scientific instruments, materials processing and mining equipment, and transportation vehicles. Non-human spaceflight capabilities include, inter alia, robots and probes, satellites, ground tracking stations, launch vehicles, scientific instruments, and support crew to enable such capabilities.
A. The Model of Reasoning
The model of reasoning test was the first step in our analysis of the space policy proposals below and had five defined steps (Stone 2002 , p. 8):
1) Identify objectives.
2) Identify alternative courses of action for achieving objectives.
3) Predict the possible consequences of each alternative. 4) Evaluate the possible consequences for each alternative. 5) Select the alternative that maximizes the attainment of the objectives. 28 Each step was designed to examine in detail a particular space policy proposal. The first step in the test was to identify the objectives of a proposal. This was a straightforward task that required only identifying those objectives explicitly stated within a given proposal. Did space policy proposers discuss a designated course of action (COA) to implement each objective? It is one thing to advise policymakers to undertake objectives; it is another to show them how to get from A to Z. If one or more of a space policy proposal's objectives did not identify COAs "stepping to" objectives, or if the COAs were not congruent with the stated objectives, then we were able to evaluate the reasonableness of achieving those objectives in the absence of COAs or of appropriate COAs. Next, we evaluated a proposal with respect to its having enunciated alternative COAs for reaching its objectives. As with proposers' preferred COAs, alternative COAs may not be congruent with a proposal's stated objectives. Herein, when proposers did not identify alternative COAs, we made that effort ourselves with an eye toward congruency with their stated objectives.
Once we identified and defined a proposal's objectives and its preferred and alternative COAs, we turned to predicting the possible consequences for each COA. Predicting the possible consequences of COAs gave us a sense of how well the proposal met its stated objectives. § The evaluation of the possible consequences of each alternative was important to understand how well a proposal compared to the baseline for human and non-human spaceflight capabilities. It also helped us to compare similar proposals. Lastly, the COAs that maximized the attainment of a space policy proposal's stated objectives were chosen and compared against the baseline for human and non-human spaceflight capabilities.
B. The Model of Society
The model of society test took into account the tendency a society (i.e., a nation-state) displays in implementing policies. This test can map where a particular proposal falls between market and political community parameters (Figure 1) . In making this test, we distinguished between whose interests were being served by a particular policy proposal. Did a policy proposal advance a market model, whereby the purpose was to maximize individual stakeholders' interests (i.e., persons with interests in the policy), or other private stakeholders' interests (i.e., private firms')? Or did the policy proposal advance the political community model, whereby the purpose was to maximize the interests of the public (i.e., the population within a society) or, to some degree, the international community? This is important to note because many policy proposals aim to advance free-market objectives while also rationalizing the need for international cooperation; moreover, the belief that space can help unite society.
As seen in Figure 2 , nation-states are limited by how they balance international cooperation with private participation with respect to policy implementation. A nation-state's interests are bounded relative to private participation and international cooperation. There may be limits to which nation-states will use private industry and bi-or multi-lateral agreements in the pursuit of policy. That balance can be determined at any given time should we wish to add quantitative rigor to our tests (more on this later). Suffice to say for now that if a proposed policy tended toward favoring private participation, then we can say the policy tends toward the market model. On the other hand, if the policy tended toward international cooperation, then the policy would tend toward the political community model. Herein, we have taken each proposal and evaluated it against where it maps along the market-political community continuum. How we relatively determined where the Abbey, et al. and Hsu and Cox proposals mapped on that continuum was through a process represented by 
C. The Model of Policy-Making
The model of policy-making relied on the first and second tests via an examination of how a policy proposal defined its objectives and how it intended to attain those objectives. Definition of objectives and the COAs to meet those objectives are major components for the decision-making process. The model of policy-making considered whether a policy is worth pursuing, i.e., makes sense vis-à-vis the baseline elements we discussed above. We analyzed the baseline elements against each policy proposal and commented on the advantages and disadvantages of implementing each baseline element derived from the first and second model tests. See Table 2 Reduction in workforce, must accept 5 to 8-year U.S. manned flight gap, rely on foreign systems.
Possible conflict with foreign policy objectives. Table 3d . Concerning the space shuttle ******** The Kistler example refers to Rocketplane and Kistler, private companies that merged to take on a Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) contract with NASA to build a reusable launch system to take spacecraft into Earth orbit. After missing a succession of financial milestones, NASA terminated the contract. This one example alone points up the danger of expecting "rocket science" from business models that derive from the virtual reality community. While Rocketplane and Kistler were started by "rocket scientists," all too often the financing for such ventures in today's world follows the computer industry's model. As we have said before, "There is no Moore's Law for rocketry." More emphasis on and funding of robotic space science projects.
Realistically, probably at the expense of manned space projects, but given disparity in budgets, probably small impact.
Ensure an ongoing and effective robotic space science program.
Status quo.
Current reduced level of funding to fund Shuttle and Constellation.
Maintain current level of emphasis on and funding of robotic space science projects.
No impact on manned space projects. More emphasis on and funding of aeronautical research, recapture technical lead, market share of U.S. manufacturers.
Implement a reinvigorated and effective aeronautical research program.
Status quo. Maintain at current levels.
Maintain current level of emphasis on and funding of aeronautical research.
No impact on manned space projects. 
The Space Shuttle
While extending a dead-end system presents some risk and drains public funds from the development of a new system (Constellation), it maintains private labor forces (i.e., Lockheed-Martin's and Boeing's United Space Alliance) and public labor forces. Keeping the Shuttle flying narrows the U.S. manned flight gap between the Space Shuttle being mothballed and the Orion coming on line. There are geopolitical ramifications to this gap. Our foreign policy national interests are held hostage by our dependence on other space capable countries (Russia and China), but whose national interests may conflict with ours.
Energy and Environment
It is not clear what private stakeholders would be better off with a NASA mission focused on energy and the environment at the expense of human spaceflight. What more can NASA do that it is not doing already, or those other agencies, like the Department of Energy (DOE) and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) are not already doing? NASA energy and environment projects that are an extension of their satellite and ISS missions are not likely to create tens of thousands of new jobs. For example, NASA weather satellite tracking stations only employ handfuls of people in host communities. The public stakeholder in a NASA mission that is inward looking is the U.S. Government. It would save billions of dollars in manned missions never flown.
Robotic Space Science
Abbey, et al. propose an effective ongoing robotic space science program. While such a program will likely be at the expense of the human spaceflight budget, its impact will likely be minimal. Robotic systems cannot do everything that humans need from space exploration, but they are certainly necessary partners to human systems. Private and public stakeholders will likely be maintained at nearly current levels and among the same cast of characters. This could change if nanotechnology verged with robotics to create medical or certain industrial applications. Such a "marriage" would create an overarching industry with various specialties like the computer industry that employs millions of people worldwide.
Aeronautical Research
The aviation industry is among the largest in the world that touches billions of lives daily. If reinvigorated aeronautical budgets for NASA mean being not much different from those that it has had during its organizational lifetime, and if NASA can help solve for the challenges of running aircraft on the decline side of oil, then its aeronautical research is the biggest bang for the buck. Private stakeholders might multiply as NASA aeronautical innovations are built into new aircraft and overhaul existing ones. Among the public stakeholders are those U.S. Government entities that rely on aviation, like the military services.
Stakeholders
Stakeholder The model of society test, as we have qualitatively conceptualized it thus far, shows an overlap in public and private stakeholder interests in terms of what NASA can do in the realms of: canceling Ares I, using Orion in LEO, keeping the Space Shuttle flying, and aeronautical research. If we were to try and estimate where the Abbey, et al. policy falls on the market-political community continuum as depicted in Figure 1 , there might be some trend toward the political community end, with the U.S. Government's interest in putting "beyond LEO" manned spaceflight on indefinite hold. If we were to quantify this model, we might expect some changes in this profile (more on this later). What is more, historical events could make a difference. If private and international interests affect the profile of a nation-state's policies (as conceptualized in Figure 2 ), then, in the case of the American manned space endeavor, the United States could find its space policy profile being radically altered as more nation-states find their way into space and as American private interests clamor for the federal government to respond. Definition of objectives and the COAs to meet those objectives are major components for the decision-making process. The model of policy-making relied on the first and second tests after having learned through conducting how a policy proposal defined its objectives and how it intended to attain those objectives (its COAs). Is the policy worth pursuing (i.e., makes sense vis-à-vis the baseline elements we discussed above)? Here again, we plug in Abbey, et al.'s preferred COAs and do not include in this test the alternative COAs at which we ourselves arrived (as seen in Tables 3a -3g ). These include:
• Restructuring the human space initiative (by canceling Ares I);
• The Moon and Mars (putting these goals of human spaceflight on hold indefinitely);
• Orion (scaling it back for LEO use only);
• The Space Shuttle (continue to fly it through 2015);
• Energy and environment (divert NASA's effort to these issues);
• Robotic space science (invigorate NASA's effort); and
The results of this test let us break out the implications for implementation by deciphering which preferred Abbey, et al.'s COAs were pragmatic (and therefore easier to implement) and which were problematic (and therefore harder to implement). Let us take each COA by turn.
There does not seem to be much foreseeable resistance or disadvantages to the scrapping Ares I COA (Table 5a ). Because Delta IV and Atlas V upgrades can likely be made in order to fly the Orion payload, it might make sense to scrap Ares I.
Baseline elements framed as questions
Restructuring the human space initiative (by canceling Ares I)
Advantages/Disadvantages
Is the objective/COA financially feasible?
Yes. End problematic cash flow issues with the launch system; opportunities will be stimulated in the upgrade of the Delta IV and the Atlas V. Is the objective/COA technically feasible?
Yes.
Boeing and Lockheed will have to work the technical problems to upgrade the Delta IV and the Atlas V, respectively. Will the objective/COA have political and public support?
Yes. There may be resistance among some private and public (Congressional) stakeholders who may be advantaged by the go-ahead of the Ares I. But, this will not likely amount to much if the Delta IV and the Atlas V can be upgraded.
Scrapping the problematic launch system may actually win more political and public support.
Will the objective/COA meet legal requirements (national and international)?
Yes, based on the earlier parameters of the Delta IV and the Atlas V.
No disadvantages.
Will the COA permit the end objective to conduct independent or cooperative missions?
No disadvantages. Putting human spaceflight to the Moon and Mars on indefinite hold is problematic (Table 5b) . Yes, putting humans in space is costly. But, for NASA to concede this part of its organizational mission is to invite two categories of predations: 1) "give an inch, take a mile" inroads on the NASA budget and 2) questions about the raison d'être of NASA. The sweeping disadvantage of taking the Moon and Mars off the table, as mentioned above and elsewhere, is that it subtracts a whole evolutionary train of science and technology from the human knowledge base -science and technology relating to extremity of environment. This sophistication of know-how is necessary to turn around and apply to the mitigation of the effects of climate change and related issues. Not to mature that evolutionary train "beyond LEO" is not to have it when it is needed for Earth-side extremity. No. There will be great resistance among pro-space private and public "audiences." When a wider array of audiences is made aware of the downside of not sending humans to the Moon and Mars, they will resist, too. No disadvantages.
Yes, on smaller scale human and unmanned missions, and where in time, we find ourselves partnering with a lowergrade array of partners.
Pursuing this COA will increasingly weaken the U.S.'s ranking in the world system of societies and will set it on a trajectory to the semi-periphery and outside the scope of various rising alliances among Europe, Russia, China, India, and others. (Table 5c) . But, putting human missions to the Moon and Mars on indefinite hold is not pragmatic in a seminal and overarching way, as we discussed above. And, as we will discuss below, the Space Shuttle has wrongfully been tarred "an aging system" and should not be retired prematurely. In addition to other downturns, "Orion for LEO only" reduces our ability to cooperate with other nations in space.
Baseline elements framed as questions
Scaling back Orion for LEO use only Advantages/Disadvantages Is the objective/COA financially feasible?
Saves money on designing and implementing the additional materiel and systems needed for "beyond LEO" flight; with downmoding, spacecraft may be ready sooner to help fill the gap between Space Shuttle retirement and Orion coming on line. Is the objective/COA technically feasible?
Some stakeholders, such as private companies that can design "beyond LEO" systems will be cut out of benefiting from the implementation of the "fully loaded" spacecraft. Will the objective/COA have political and public support?
No. There will be great resistance among pro-space private and public "audiences." When a wider array of audiences is made aware of the downside of not having a spacecraft to get to the Moon and Mars, they will resist, too.
May have the effect of further dispiriting an American public.
Yes, but on a smaller scale than otherwise would be possible even with the Space Shuttle.
It is a "math problem." The Orion can hold up to six crewmates. The Space Shuttle can hold a maximum of 10 crewmates. That fact delimits the numbers of foreign astronauts who can fly any one American space mission on LEO in Orion. (Table 5d ). The gap between Space Shuttle retirement and bringing Orion online is artificial. If the Space Shuttle fleet were retired today, the U.S. Government would put in mothballs a relatively young fleet. Each spacecraft was designed for 100 missions, whose operating life could conceivably be extended longer. None of the Shuttles have flown 100 flights. Atlantis just made its 30 th flight, Discovery has 36 missions on it, and Endeavour has made only 22 flights. These spacecraft have been refitted with new systems, i.e., new avionics. The Challenger and Columbia disasters were entirely preventable as the after-actions on those accidents have revealed. However, when the latter was lost, the news media began to tout "an aging Shuttle fleet." Newscasters are notoriously bad aerospace engineers. The U.S. Government is being railroaded into retiring a perfectly good orbital transport system by a perception created by the infotainment industry. In actual fact, the Space Shuttle fleet could keep flying right up till whenever we have a "good to go" Orion spacecraft and a new man-rated launch system.
The pragmatism in prematurely retiring the shuttle fleet is to be found by following the money trail. Premature retirement would mean a savings of just under half a billion dollars per Shuttle launch held against reliance on bumming rides from the Russians up to the space station, which runs around 20 million dollars or so per astronaut flown on a Soyuz spacecraft. The final decision is all in according to what we Americans want to save -money or the other things of value that make us a nation and that add to our ranking in the world system of societies. Yes.
Stakeholders, such as companies that support the Space Shuttle will continue to benefit from it continuing to be used for American spaceflight. Will the objective/COA have political and public support?
That the U.S. can get its astronauts on orbit on its own will help bolster the spirits of the American public. Will the objective/COA meet legal requirements (national and international)?
No disadvantages. There has been no cost analysis to explain how NASA can make these efforts better than other agencies invested with energy and environmental missions. Is the objective/COA technically feasible?
To the extent that Abbey, et al. imply, this answer is unknown.
There has been no analysis to explain how NASA is technically equipped to make these efforts better than other agencies invested with energy and environmental missions. Will the objective/COA have political and public support?
Yes and no. Yes, because private and public audiences can understand energy and environmental problems as they become more noticeable in daily life. And, they will seek solutions from any agency that says it has a plan. No, because private and public audiences favoring human and robotic exploration of the solar system will not support it because this diversion will kill the quintessential NASA mission.
A substantial number of Congressional members and federal executives will question NASA's ability to make these efforts better than other agencies that already make these efforts. And, that will invite questions about NASA's raison d'être.
Perhaps not. There may be some legal tussling on the national scene if NASA goes "outside of its lane."
Legal squabbles could drain the effectiveness of NASA and other agencies that are involved. Will the COA permit the end objective to conduct independent or cooperative missions?
To the extent that Abbey, et al. imply, this answer is unclear.
Lack of data to make an assessment. Invigorating NASA's robotic space science effort seems imminently pragmatic and there are no disadvantages as of yet in ramping up this pursuit (Table 5f ). However, using robots should be weighed against the appropriateness of human spaceflight for certain types of missions. No doubt robots can reap great rewards, but they are limited in their ability to conduct various mission types and are only designed for limited usage. No disadvantages as yet.
No disadvantages. Table 5f . Invigoration of NASA's robotic space science effort as held against the metric of baseline questions
Aeronautical research is an older part of the core NASA mission that has been made new again with the decline side of oil (Table 5g ). It is not only an imminently pragmatic COA to follow, but also part of a greater energy and environmental effort for cleaner and more efficient engines and fuselage design. It would make sense for NASA to continue to lead the charge on aeronautical research. Yes.
Seems imminently practical extrapolating from current aeronautical research efforts. Is the objective/COA technically feasible?
Will the objective/COA have political and public support?
Yes, very much so because private and public audiences are in favor of aviation safety measures of all types and are concerned about the survival of the airlines on the decline side of oil.
No disadvantages as yet.
Yes. No disadvantages.
Table 5g. Invigoration of NASA's aeronautical research as held against the metric of baseline questions
The model of policy-making has been used above to integrate the various issues related to policy development in an attempt to create a broader picture of the implications of the Abbey, et al. policy proposal. We have attempted to account for the implications of all the objectives noted by Abbey, et al. Additionally, we have pointed out the societal implications of the various objectives noted above. Below is a summary of our findings.
D. Abbey, et al. --Summary of Results from All the Tests
We have examined in detail Abbey et al.'s recommendations through the application of the three tests by which public policies can be evaluated: 1) the model of reasoning, the model of society, and the model of policy-making. The model of reasoning was useful to us in defining Abbey, et al.'s objectives and COAs, in understanding their overall rationale, as well as to examine some of our own COAs. The model of society demonstrated a solid overlap in public and private stakeholder interests for canceling Ares I, using Orion in LEO, keeping the Space Shuttle flying, and NASA invigorating its aeronautical research efforts. The model of policy-making showed: the pragmatism of 1) scrapping Ares I; 2) keeping the Space Shuttle flying; 3) invigorating NASA's efforts in robotic space science; and 4) invigorating NASA's aeronautical research. On the other hand, the model of policy-making exposed the weaknesses in: 1) putting Moon and Mars human goals on indefinite hold; 2) scaling back Orion for LEO only; and 3) diverting NASA's effort to energy and environmental issues.
E. Hsu and Cox -the Model of Reasoning
In February 2009, Feng Hsu and Ken Cox of the Aerospace Technology Working Group announced a space policy proposal meant to put into perspective NASA's prior shortcomings.
§ § § § § § § § Their white paper criticized NASA for not "successfully address[ing] the issues of affordability and sustainability in space exploration, and affordability and profitability in space commerce development." ********* They are further critical of President George W. Bush's Vision for Space Exploration.
We found that the overall objective in the Hsu and Cox proposal was to set up a U.S. Department of Space with a number of priorities, chief among which was setting up a space transportation infrastructure within the EarthMoon system. They referred to these objectives and the attendant COAs as a Unified Space Vision (USV). Besides stating their own preferred COAs, Hsu and Cox did not discuss any alternative COAs to meet their objective. What is more, the proposal authors were short on detail for their own preferred COAs that involved:
• Establishing a Department of Space with a litany of priorities;
• Setting a space transportation infrastructure within the Earth-Moon system (highest priority);
• Focusing the most on the development of re-usable launch vehicles (RLVs);
• Developing and establishing an international fuel depot and orbital staging/service space station in LEO;
• Promoting/supporting the establishment and construction of spaceport infrastructure in strategic locations within the U.S. and around the world; Might not be perceived to be in the national interest. Will not succeed without a business case.
Promotion and support is probably low-cost to the government. 5.1. Promote and support the establishment and construction of spaceport infrastructure development in several strategic locations within the U.S. and around the globe, which will be utilized to meet the emerging demand of increased commercial launch and space-transport economic activities.
Status quo.
Commercial carriers have fewer options to access space.
Little or no impact until commercial need becomes evident. May accelerate development of space-based solar power.
Might not be cost-effective vs. Earth-based alternatives.
Slower development of space-based solar power.
Longer and deeper fossil fuel dependence, or development of Earth-based alternatives. 
F. Hsu and Cox -The Model of Society
In making our assessment of stakeholders, private and public, implicit in the Hsu and Cox proposal, we have strictly predicated our appraisal on only the proposers' preferred COAs -not from the alternative COAs that we proposed above in our model of reasoning examination.
Establishing a Department of Space with a Litany of Priorities
It would be formidable getting the legislation that would carve out a whole new federal department that focuses on deep space development (i.e., construction, at least as far afield as the Moon), that would be separate from NASA (whose mandates would be aeronautics research and space exploration). There would be minimal U.S. Government interest in this in consideration of other issues: wars on two fronts, the condition of American health care, the United States' crumbling infrastructure of roads, bridges, etc., and the problem of America's competitiveness in the world, to give a few examples. Selling a Department of Space as such on Capitol Hill would be viewed as "pie in the sky." Members of Congress with aerospace industries in their districts would be in favor of it because they and their constituents have the most to gain. But, they are just a few in Congress.
Private individuals and firms invested in the vision and the professed mission of solar system development would benefit the most. However, most of the private firms that attend commercial space conferences and that tout commercial space interests beyond near-Earth space are small and possessive of more vision than actual assets and abilities to do anything off the Earth. Lockheed-Martin, Boeing, and other large aerospace-related companies would certainly bid on any projects that might result from a Department of Space and might support a planned department if they could be convinced large capital projects would materialize from it.
Setting a Space Transportation Infrastructure within the Earth-Moon System (Highest Priority)
The large aerospace companies like Lockheed-Martin and Boeing, their labor forces, and the communities that host them would show great stakeholder interest. What is proposed is a large capital project, so perhaps foreign private firms would be allowed to bid. And, of course, their labor forces, and the communities that host them would benefit as well. But, something needs to be brought up at this juncture. Even if we could launch and maneuver a large amount of technology and materiel into space -stepping from the Earth to the Moon -the type of astronauts, cosmonauts, and taikonauts that form the world's space flyer corps cannot be expected to do this construction work or all of it. First of all, there are not enough of them, and most of them are far too valuable as scientists and engineers to demote them to "hardhats in space." Something like a large force of "hard hat" astronauts would have to be trained to do construction work in space. And, such people would come with a host of difficulties. They would have trouble getting security clearances, which is a problem that keeps many would-be civilian military contractors out of the American war zones. Presumably, some of their work would be of a national or global security nature. They could not all be expected to have perfect teeth, as the Chinese space program requires. The list goes on and on concerning how they would be different than existing space flyers. Such an astronaut corps is a completely different breed of cat. But, if a truly large amount of technology and materiel were required to serve the space between the Earth and the Moon, these are the people that will be needed.
There would be minimal U.S. Government interest. Even if the U.S. put a permanent base on the Moon, such an infrastructure would not be a priority.
Focusing the most on the Development of Re-usable Launch Vehicles (RLVs)
To put all the technology, materiel, and hard hats in space to assemble large capital infrastructure between the Earth and the Moon will require RLVs. There would be a great deal of interest among large aerospace companies throughout the world vying to build these vehicles. The companies that would win bids, their labor forces, and their host communities would benefit. There would be a good deal of U.S. Government interest, particularly within the Department of Defense, because RLVs can be used for lofting other projects.
Developing and Establishing an International Fuel Depot and Orbital Staging/Service Space Station in LEO
The same sort of companies as mentioned above, their labor forces, and their host communities would benefit from constructing this particular infrastructure in LEO. Again, the "hard hat" astronaut corps would have to be deployed. There would be minimal U.S. Government interest unless a permanent base on the Moon and substantial industries on LEO were to be established.
Promoting/Supporting the Establishment and Construction of Spaceport Infrastructure in Strategic Locations within the U.S. and around the World
Worldwide, private companies would build the spaceports; and their labor forces and their host communities would benefit. The federal government has shown interest in designating some facilities in the U.S. as spaceports, but there has been little interest in putting launch facilities on foreign soil. This attitude could change, however, if a new technology, like a space plane, were to be developed and put to application. But, likely, these sorts of spaceports would be owned and managed much as airports are throughout the world. In the United States, ownership and management usually falls to cities and counties. Sometimes they are privately owned by large aerospace companies.
Develop Enabling Space Infrastructure and Observation and Tracking Capabilities for Planetary Defense
Worldwide, private companies, in collaboration with military and security sectors, would help build the planetary defense infrastructure and capabilities. Their labor forces and their host communities would benefit. We would have put this item at the top of the priority list for a Department of Space. Substantial impacts and nearimpacts from near-Earth objects is a very real threat. Just because one has not devastated an area of the Earth since the Tunguska atmospheric bounce does not mean one will not strike again soon. Not having the Earth struck by a large asteroid or comet would certainly benefit the population of the entire Earth. There is minimal U.S. Government interest in this area. While some federal funding has been spent on tracking Near-Earth Objects and discussing mitigation strategies, it will probably take a near-miss or the "blood priority" of a strike on U.S. soil to ramp up serious spending.
Investing in Space-based Solar Power (SBSP) Research and Development
Upon investment and appropriate research and development, worldwide, the large private aerospace and power companies would help build the SBSP arrays and stations; their labor forces and their host communities would benefit. Billions of users would benefit from electricity generated through SBSP. Energy-starvation and the conversion of personal transportation to electricity guarantees something like a heavier U.S. Government interest sooner, rather than later.
The model of society test, as we have qualitatively conceptualized it thus far, shows an overlap in public and private stakeholder interests in terms of RLVs and space-based solar power. Clearly, before private interests can act, where there would be expected a great deal of stakeholdership, government needs to lead the way. But, the U.S. Government is not going to lead the way on the total package of the Hsu and Cox proposal. If we were to estimate where the Hsu and Cox policy falls on the market-political community continuum as depicted in Figure 1 , there would be a distinct trend toward the market end.
As with the Abbey, et al. proposal, if we were to quantify this model, we might expect some changes in this profile. More on this later. And, as mentioned before, historical events could make a difference. If private and international interests affect the profile of a nation-state's policies (as conceptualized in Figure 2) , then, in the case of the American manned space endeavor, the United States could find its space policy profile being radically altered as more nation-states find their way into space and as American private interests clamor for the federal government to respond.
Stakeholders
Stakeholder Interests Served by Proposal Private Stakeholders' Interests Private -Establishing a Department of Space Private individuals and firms invested in the vision/mission of solar system development would benefit the most. However, most of the private firms on the books that tout a commercial space interest beyond near-Earth space are small and possessive of more vision than actual assets and abilities to do anything off the Earth. Lockheed-Martin, Boeing, and other large aerospace-related companies would bid on any projects that might result from a Department of Space. If projects would emerge (such as those below), these companies' labor forces and host communities would benefit.
Minimal weight among private stakeholders
Private -Establishing a space transportation infrastructure within the Earth-Moon system (highest priority) Not only the large aerospace companies mentioned above would benefit; their labor forces, and the communities that host them would, too. But also, perhaps foreign private firms would be allowed to bid. And, of course, their labor forces, and the communities that host them would benefit as well. An astronaut corps that would more resemble "hardhats in space" would have to be convened for this work.
Space transportation infrastructure between the Earth and Moon
Private -Focusing the most on the development of reusable launch vehicles (RLVs) Worldwide: the large private aerospace companies would build the RLVs; their labor forces and their host communities would benefit.
RLVs
Private -Developing and establishing an international fuel depot and orbital staging/service space station in LEO Worldwide: the private companies that would build this infrastructure, their labor forces, and their host communities would benefit. An astronaut corps that would more resemble "hardhats in space" would have to be convened for this work. Public -Promoting/supporting the establishment and construction of spaceport infrastructure in strategic locations within the U.S. and around the world
The federal government has shown interest in designating some facilities in the U.S. as spaceports, but there has been little interest in putting launch facilities on foreign soil.
Public -Developing enabling space infrastructure and observation and tracking capabilities for planetary defense Minimal U.S. Government interest. While some federal funding has been spent on tracking Near-Earth Objects and discussing mitigation strategies, it will probably take a nearmiss or the "blood priority" of a strike on U.S. soil to ramp up serious spending.
Public -Investing in spacebased solar power (SBSP) research and development Energy-starvation and the conversion of personal transportation to electricity guarantees something like a heavier U.S. Government interest sooner, rather than later.
Space-based solar power
7b. Public stakeholders and their interests served by Hsu and Cox

G. Hsu and Cox -The Model of Policy-Making
As said before, the model of policy-making relied on the first and second tests by having learned through conducting them how a policy proposal defined its objectives and how it intended to attain those objectives (its COAs). Definition of objectives and the COAs to meet those objectives are major components for the decisionmaking process. Is the policy worth pursuing (i.e., makes sense vis-à-vis the baseline elements we discussed above)? Here again, we plug in Hsu's and Cox's preferred COAs and do not include in this test the alternative COAs at which we ourselves arrived (as seen in Tables 6a -6g). These include:
• Promoting/supporting the establishment and construction of spaceport infrastructure in strategic locations within the U.S. and around the world; The results of this test let us break out the implications for implementation by deciphering which preferred of Hsu's and Cox's COAs were pragmatic (and therefore easier to implement) and which were problematic (and therefore harder to implement). Let us take each COA by turn.
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A major drawback of this proposal is that it calls for a great deal of large capital projects dependent upon new technologies to be enacted under a banner that will be viewed as "pie in the sky" (Table 8a) Yes and no. There would be a good deal of support from among the prospace public, but the political enemies of pro-space would point out the flaws in this COA and would counteract its being adopted.
It calls for a lot of large capital projects under a banner that will be labeled "pie in the sky."
Unknown
There The Hsu and Cox space transportation infrastructure seems to have the cart before the horse, putting the end state first, whereas it is a COA best plied at the terminus of other steps in space between the Earth and the Moon (Table  8b) . Where are the initial productive infrastructures on the Moon? Otherwise, this infrastructure is simply a "highway to nowhere." Moreover, to build any of the large-scale capital projects that they name in their proposal will require a "hard hat" astronaut corps that no national space agency currently recruits and trains, not to mention the infrastructure to accommodate them while they are on the job in space. Yes and no. There would be a good deal of support from among the prospace public, but the political enemies of pro-space would point out the flaws in this COA and would counteract its being adopted.
Advantage: Would need the creation of a "hard hat" astronaut corps.
Disadvantage: A bit "cart before the horse" in nature. The Hsu and Cox "highest priority" seems more like an end state of other steps.
Yes No disadvantages. Yes, among pro-space advocates and among those who can be convinced of the RLVs' cost-effectiveness.
Those stakeholders currently profiting from non-RLVs may be resistant at first, but might be expected to re-tool to profit from production of RLVs. Will the objective/COA meet legal requirements (national and international)?
No disadvantages. (Table 8d) . It sounds like it is the initium at the head of the Earth-Moon transportation infrastructure where on-surface lunar facilities are at its terminus. However, as with the Earth-Moon transportation infrastructure, they do not explain why all these facilities would be needed. Supposing the need would be eventually to exploit space-based energy sources, to include helium-3 mining on the Moon, the RLV spacecraft serving those purposes would have to be co-developed with these facilities. Otherwise, the cautionary tale of the Space Shuttle and Space Station Freedom of uncoupled co-components would repeat in history. Yes, among pro-space advocates and among those who can be convinced of the necessity, or eventual necessity, of the project.
It is not clear what necessity this project is meeting.
Yes. No disadvantages. Much on the necessity of spaceports the proposers would locate around the world is unclear (Table 8e ). Certainly, if there were high launching and re-entry traffic, more spaceports would have to be constructed to accommodate specific types of spacecraft. The construction of spaceports in areas of the world that are poorer than others could bring an influx of opportunity and wealth for those locations. Further upsides are that spaceport technology is probably readily available without much further development, they can probably be operated like international airports, and the body of air and space international law is sufficient to cover the placement of a set of cooperating spaceports around the world. Having a planetary defense system to ward off would-be impactors is more pragmatic than many people are prepared to believe (Table 8f ). In the absence of "blood priority," i.e., being able to enumerate the dead killed at a problematic intersection in order to get a traffic light installed, convincing politicians and many members of the public of the necessity of a planetary defense system reads like so much science fiction. When and if people are convinced that they need a defense system against impactors, then international negotiations can proceed, which will not be without their sticking points. By definition, the system is a weapon of mass destruction that is prohibited by the Outer Space Treaty, for instance.
Baseline elements framed as questions
Planetary defense Advantages/Disadvantages Is the objective/COA financially feasible?
Unknown, much funding for the annual budget of this project probably dwells within the world's defense departments and similar organizations.
Of the proposers' conceptualizations, this is one of the necessary applications of aerospace technology.
Is the objective/COA technically feasible? Yes, but other technologies need to be developed.
Yes, once politicians and the public understand the danger the Earth is in from impactors. But, even so, it will be a tough "sell." On something like this, "blood priority" events have to be within recent memory.
This will require some negotiations to hash out a planetary defense treaty, the origins of which might be found within existing international law. However, some "stickler" examples, to the contrary, are problematic. By definition, a planetary defense system is a weapon of mass destruction, which is prohibited by the Outer Space Treaty.
Per se, international dialogue and negotiation is beneficial.
Table 8f. A planetary defense system as held against the metric of baseline questions
The space-based solar power issue is the second of two of the proposers' pragmatic COAs (Table 8g ). This will likely be the main rationale for putting a wide array of space transportation infrastructure between the Earth and the Moon. Generally, individuals who live in urban areas have an understanding of the effects a power outage can have on daily routines. Freighting "hard hat" astronauts, materiel, and technologies aloft to keep the power on is not such a quantum leap, but could be expensive. In some parts of the world, there is no regular electrical power. Still individuals and nations seek to acquire electrical generators, nuclear power plants, and/or traditional electricity grids. As personal transportation systems come to rely more on electrical power on the decline side of oil, and as global population increases, the need for electrical power will intensify. However, the practicality of develop such infrastructure may also run into allocative problems and legal limitations. These issues would need to be mitigated as the technology matures, including labor practices and standards for construction and maintenance crews. Yes, but only with sustained multiyear, multiple streams of revenue.
Advantage: Can provide electrical power on the decline side of oil as increasingly more personal transport systems depend on electricity.
This is another of the proposers' practical COAs. Is the objective/COA technically feasible?
Yes, but other technologies will have to be innovated.
Yes, but many politicians and members of the public will need to be convinced that there are no safety and health hazards on the ground and that the systems deployed in space are necessary.
Some national and international laws concerning power production and grids will have to be updated.
Table 8g. Space-based solar power (SBSP) as held against the metric of baseline questions
The model of policy-making has been used above to integrate the various issues related to policy development in an attempt to create a broader picture of the implications of the Hsu and Cox. policy proposal. We have attempted to account for the implications of all the objectives noted by Hsu and Cox. Additionally, we have pointed out the societal implications of the various objectives noted above. Below is a summary of our findings.
H. Hsu and Cox --Summary of Results From All the Tests
We have examined in detail Hsu's and Cox's recommendations through the application of the three tests by which public policies can be evaluated: 1) the model of reasoning, the model of society, and the model of policymaking. The model of reasoning was useful to us in defining Hsu's and Cox's objectives and COAs, in understanding their overall rationale, as well as examining some of our own COAs. The model of society demonstrated a solid overlap in public and private stakeholder interests for RLVs and space-based solar power. Clearly, before private stakeholders can act, government needs to lead the way. But, the U.S. Government is not going to lead the way on the total package of the Hsu and Cox proposal. In making our assessments, phrases like "highway to nowhere," "cart before the horse," and "pie in the sky" kept occurring to us as we looked at the proposal through the lenses of society and various private and public stakeholders. The model of policy-making showed the pragmatism of 1) RLVs, 2) planetary defense, and 3) space-based solar power. It also demonstrated the weaknesses in advocating outright for 1) a Department of Space, 2) a space transportation infrastructure between the Earth and the Moon, 3) an international fuel depot and orbital staging/service space station, and 4) an Earthside spaceport infrastructure.
V. Discussion
Below we discuss the preliminary findings of the Augustine Panel on U.S. Human Spaceflight plans. Additionally, we discuss some of the issues that were brought up by Abbey, et al. and Hsu and Feng in their space policy proposals. Finally, we give our own thoughts on the way forward for NASA given the limitations NASA faces, as noted above, as well as the various space related issue areas that do or might affect NASA as noted in our analysis thus far. . 31, 32 The steps that took men to the Moon created the current level of globalization that, while creating problems, created great leaps in science and technology that have improved the lives of billions and have introduced countless others to a higher bar in the standard of living, life chances, and expectations of social investment. As with any human advancement, it is at once a sword and a plowshare.
Moreover, taking humans out of the picture for the Moon and Mars may have the effect of "taking the stars out of the flag" for Americans who have seen a string of events play out since 9/11 which have led to two wearisome wars. Our national honor, our esprit de corps as Americans, our can-do attitudes, and our dreams are on the line. The pursuit of the Moon and Mars has the power to renovate the American soul, just as much as that pursuit will put the quantum leap into American innovation. If this level of innovation is not made, the U.S.'s ranking in the world system of societies will set our country on a trajectory to the semi-periphery of the world system of societies and outside the scope of various rising alliances among Europe, Russia, China, and India -alliances that will do "big science" and enact "great policy" that will ensure their places at the core of the global system.
Human spaceflight, especially in increasing distances away from the Earth, is enormously costly and requires guaranteed, multi-year revenue. Yet, it is the one of the few human activities that has proven to be of monumental worth to the American people and to the world. We are not speaking of the "flags and footprints" of the Moon missions that won the Space Race or even of the first photographs from the Moon of the Earth, but of the combinatorial effects of the technologies that stepped to the Apollo program and the legacy of Apollo that made the world at once smaller and greater than what it once was. If the Apollo program of the 1960s and 1970s can have such a far-reaching impact as it had, what impact might an "Apollo program" with today's current technology have on an Earth becoming more extreme? Abbey et al. see part of the solution for NASA's relevancy, but that piece alone will deal NASA a death blow. Energy and environment missions must be conjoined at various interfaces with sustained human missions on Earth orbit and to the Moon and Mars. Such an "Apollo program" must include other global partners. As we have previously written (Dudley-Flores 2008), 33 one of the diagnostic factors of those societies that will emerge as core in the renegotiating world order will be those nation-states that are willing to partner with other space capable nation-states.
The focus on robotic missions has also de-emphasized NASA's human spaceflight program. While the robotic missions to Mars and probes to other bodies in the Solar System are indeed an important aspect of NASA space policy, human spaceflight is paramount to developing outer space for scientific and commercial ventures. We can only learn so much and do so many things with robots. Sending robots in place of humans is absurd in the long run unless human society agrees to stay put on Earth. However, it is doubtful that such sentiment does exist, or will exist in the future. In that light, the robotic exploration of the Solar System is best understood as either precursory or augmentative to human exploration.
The current debate regarding the inward focus of space infrastructure such as satellites to monitor the Earth is insufficient with respect to meeting the goals of increasing space capabilities. Earth monitoring is an important space objective, however it is doubtful that increased monitoring will reap greater future benefits relative to developing infrastructure for human habitation beyond Earth. There is no reason to suggest that infrastructure for human habitation could not also include Earth monitoring capabilities. The current debate regarding climate change should be fully compatible with developing human spaceflight capabilities. Moreover, technological development of longterm life support systems will enable more efficient, cleaner and less-costly forms of human infrastructure and assets to be utilized on Earth.
NASA's ability to monitor can also be useful in terms of resource management and utilization. We cannot imagine the construction of a worldwide power grid (the hypergrid) without the space agency's input. That being said, it is human space endeavors at increasing distances from the Earth that will create the know-how and the various technologies that will combine to reach the level of sophistication needed to adapt to climate change and all its effects. As we discussed above, that means not only staying true to the vanguard of NASA's overall mission, but also imbuing it with greater vigor. Eventually, the energy demands of the increasing billions of people on Earth will need space-based energy systems. Getting those systems up and running means getting "out there."
C. The Way Forward
The authors believe that NASA's relevance depends upon NASA leaders and space policy makers understanding that issues of space exploration are a key subset of the overarching concern for American innovation. We believe that both the Abbey, et al. and the Hsu and Cox proposals are attempting to grope their way according to this theme. "beyond LEO" goals. We similarly understand what Hsu and Cox are trying to promote. They understand that the space enterprise has to be bigger than NASA. We do not think that can be accomplished with a Department of Space. But, it has a chance under the banner of innovation. When innovation and space are practically synonymous, the rest will follow. Innovation has the ear of a wider community of publics than that of a generic sense of space.
Our methods herein for rating space policy proposals have been qualitative. However, we strive for quantitative rigor. Our future research on this score will be pitched toward that endeavor. Some conceptualizations we are entertaining include measurement of maximization of attainment of policy objectives and policy implementation scores based upon numbers and weight of opportunities and constraints.
